By leveraging blockchain, this letter proposes a blockchained federated learning (BlockFL) architecture where local learning model updates are exchanged and verified. This enables on-device machine learning without any centralized training data or coordination by utilizing a consensus mechanism in blockchain. Moreover, we analyze an end-to-end latency model of BlockFL and characterize the optimal block generation rate by considering communication, computation, and consensus delays. Index Terms-On-device machine learning, federated learning, blockchain, latency. H. Kim and S.-L. Kim are with
I. INTRODUCTION
F UTURE wireless systems are envisaged to ensure low latency and high reliability anywhere and anytime [1] - [3] . To this end, on-device machine learning is a compelling solution wherein each device stores a high-quality machine learning model and is thereby capable of make decisions, even when it loses connectivity. Training such an on-device machine learning model requires more data samples than each device's local samples, and necessitates sample exchanges with other devices [4] , [5] . In this letter, we tackle the problem of training each device's local model by federating with other devices.
One key challenge is that local data samples are owned by each device. Thus, the exchanges should keep the raw data samples private from other devices. For this purpose, as proposed in Google's federated learning (FL) [4] , [5] , referred to as vanilla FL, each device exchanges its local model update, i.e., learning model's weight and gradient parameters, from which the raw data cannot be derived. As illustrated in Fig. 1 a, the vanilla FL's exchange is enabled by the aid of a central server that aggregates and takes an ensemble average of all the local model updates, yielding a global model update. Then, each device downloads the global model update, and computes its next local update until the global model training is completed [5] . Due to these exchanges, the vanilla FL's training completion latency might be tens of minutes or more, as demonstrated in Google's keyboard application [6] .
The limitation of the vanilla FL operation is two-fold. Firstly, it relies on a single central server, which is vulnerable to the server's malfunction. This incurs inaccurate global model updates distorting all local model updates. Secondly, it does not reward the local devices. A device having a larger number of data samples contributes more to the global training. Without providing compensation, such a device is less willing to federate with the other devices possessing few data samples. In order to resolve these pressing issues, by leveraging blockchain [7] , [8] in lieu of the central server, we propose a blockchained FL (BlockFL) architecture, where the blockchain network enables exchanging devices' local model updates while verifying and providing their corresponding rewards. BlockFL overcomes the single point of failure problem and extends the range of its federation to untrustworthy devices in a public network thanks to a validation process of the local training results. Moreover, by providing rewards proportional to the training sample sizes, BlockFL promotes the federation of more devices with a larger number of training samples.
As shown in Fig. 1-b , the logical structure of BlockFL consists of devices and miners. The miners can physically be either randomly selected devices or separate nodes such as network edges (i.e., base stations in cellular networks), which are relatively free from energy constraints in mining process. The operation of BlockFL is summarized as follows: Each device computes and uploads the local model update to its associated miner in the blockchain network; Miners exchange and verify all the local model updates, and then run the Proofof-Work (PoW) [7] ; Once a miner completes the PoW, it generates a block where the verified local model updates are recorded; and finally, the generated block storing the aggregate local model updates is added to a blockchain, also known as distributed ledger, and is downloaded by devices. Each device computes the global model update from the new block.
Note that the global model update of BlockFL is computed locally at each device. A miner's or a device's malfunction does not affect other devices' global model updates. For the sake of these benefits, in contrast to the vanilla FL, BlockFL needs to account for the extra delay incurred by the blockchain network. To address this, the end-to-end latency model of BlockFL is formulated by considering communication, computation, and the PoW delays. The resulting latency is minimized by adjusting the block generation rate, i.e., the PoW difficulty.
II. ARCHITECTURE AND OPERATION FL operation in BlockFL:
The FL under study is operated by a set of devices D = {1, 2, · · · , N D } with |D| = N D . The i-th device D i owns a set of data samples S i with |S i | = N i , and trains its local model. The local model updates of the device D i is uploaded to its associated miner M j that is uniformly randomly selected out of a set of miners M = {1, 2, · · · ,N M }.
Our distributed model training focuses on solving a regression problem in a parallel manner, considering a set of the entire devices' data samples S = ∪ N D i=1 S i with |S| = N S . The k-th data sample s k ∈ S is given as s k = {x k , y k } for a d-dimensional column vector x k ∈ R d and a scalar value y k ∈ R. The objective is to minimize a loss function f (w) for a global weight vector w ∈ R d . The loss function f (w) is chosen as the mean squared error:
Other loss functions under deep neural networks can readily be incorporated, as done in [9] .
In order to solve the above problem, following the vanilla FL settings in [4] , the model of the device D i is locally trained via a stochastic variance reduced gradient algorithm [4] , and all devices' local model updates are aggregated using a distributed approximate Newton method. For each epoch,
where β > 0 is a step size, w ( ) indicates the global weight at the -th epoch, and ∇f (w
Let w ( ) i denote the local weight after the last local iteration of the -th epoch, i.e., w ( )
In vanilla FL in [4] , [5] , the device D i uploads its local model update (w ( ) i , {∇f k (w ( ) )} s k ∈S i ) to the central server, with the model update size δm that is identically given for all devices. The global model update (w ( ) , ∇f (w ( ) )) is computed by the server. In BlockFL, the server entity is substituted with a blockchain network as detailed in the following description.
Blockchain operation in BlockFL: In the BlockFL, the blocks and their verification by the miners in M are designed so as to exchange the local model updates truthfully through a distributed ledger. Each block in a ledger is divided into its body and header parts [7] . In BlockFL, the body stores the local model updates of the devices in D, i.e.,
as well as its local computation time T ( )
local,i that is discussed at the end of this subsection. The header contains the information of a pointer to the previous block, block generation rate λ, and the output value of the PoW. The size of each block is set as h + δmND, where h and δm are the header and model update sizes, respectively. Each miner has a candidate block that is filled with the local model updates from its associated devices and/or other miners. The filling procedure continues until it reaches the block size or a waiting time T wait .
Afterwards, following the PoW [7] , the miner randomly generates a hash value by changing its input number, i.e., nonce, until the generated hash value becomes smaller than a target value. Once the miner M 1 succeeds in finding the hash value, its candidate block is allowed to be a new block as shown in Fig 2. Here, the block generation rate λ can be controlled by the PoW difficulty, e.g., the lower PoW target hash value, the smaller λ. Due to simpleness and robustness, the PoW is applied to the wireless systems as in [10] , [11] . BlockFL can also use other consensus algorithms such as the proof-of-stake (PoS) or Byzantine-fault-tolerance (BFT), which may require more complicated operation and preliminaries to reach consensus among miners.
The generated block is propagated to all other miners. To this end, as done in [7] , all the miners receiving the generated block are forced to stop their PoW operations and to add the generated block to their local ledgers. As illustrated in Fig 2, if another miner M 2 succeeds in its block generation within the propagation delay of the firstly generated block, then some miners may mistakenly add this secondly generated block to their local ledgers, known as forking. In BlockFL, forking makes some devices apply an incorrect global model update to their next local model updates. Forking frequency increases with λ and the block propagation delay, and its mitigation incurs an extra delay, to be elaborated in Sect. III.
The blockchain network also provides rewards for data samples to the devices and for the verification process to the miners, referred to as data reward and mining reward, respectively. The data reward of the device D i is received from its associated miner, and its amount is proportional to the data sample size N i . When the miner M j generates a block, its mining reward is earned by the blockchain network, as done in the conventional blockchain structure [7] . The amount of mining reward is proportional to the aggregate data sample size of its all associating devices, namely,
denotes the number of devices associated with the miner M j . It is noted that the BlockFL can further be improved using a reward mechanism, which considers not only the size but also the quality of data sample that affects the accuracy of FL. Untruthful devices may inflate their sample sizes with arbitrary local model updates. Miners verify truthful local updates before storing them by comparing the sample size N i with its corresponding computation time T ( ) local,i . This can be guaranteed in practice by Intel's software guard extensions, allowing applications to be operated within a protected environment, which is utilized in blockchain technologies [12] .
One-epoch BlockFL operation: As depicted in Fig. 2 , the BlockFL operation of the device D i at the -th epoch is described by the following seven steps. 4. Block generation: Each miner starts running the PoW until either it finds the nonce or it receives a generated block. 5. Block propagation: Denoting as Mô ∈ M the miner who first finds the nonce. Its candidate block is generated as a new block and broadcasted to all miners. In order to avoid forking, an ACK, including whether forking occurs or not, is transmitted once each miner receives the new block. If a forking event occurs, the operation restarts from Step 1. A miner that generates a new block waits until a predefined maximum block ACK waiting time T a,wait . 6. Global model download: The device D i downloads the generated block from its associated miner. 7. Global model update: The device D i locally computes the global model update in (2) by using the aggregate local model updates in the generated block. The procedure continues until satisfying |w (L) −w (L−1) | ≤ ε.
Centralized FL is vulnerable to the server's malfunction that distorts all devices' global models. However, in BlockFL, the global model update is computed locally at each device, which is robust against the malfunction and prevents excessive computational overheads of miners.
III. END-TO-END LATENCY ANALYSIS
We investigate the optimal block generation rate λ * minimizing learning completion latency To, defined as the total time during L epochs at a randomly selected device Do ∈ D.
One bp,j = (h+δmND)/[Wm log 2 (1+γô j )] represents the block propagation delay from the mining winner Mô to M j ∈ M\Mô, and γô j is the miner M j 's received SNR. Lastly, in Step 4,  block generation delay T ( ) bg,j of the miner M j ∈ M follows an exponential distribution with mean 1/λ, as modeled in [8] . The delay of interest is the mining winner Mô's block generation delay T ( ) bg,ô . Finally, the -th epoch latency
where N ( ) fork denotes the number of forking occurrences in the -th epoch, and follows a geometric distribution with mean 1/(1−p ( ) fork ), with the forking probability p ( ) fork at the -th epoch. Following
Step 5, the forking probability is represented as:
where the term t ( )
bg,j is the cumulated delay until the miner M j generates a block.
Latency optimal block generation rate: Using the oneepoch latency (3), we derive the optimal block generation rate λ * that minimizes the -th epoch latency averaged over the PoW process. Here, the PoW process affects the block generation delay T ( ) bg,ô , block propagation delay T ( ) bp,ô , and the number N ( ) fork of forking occurrences, which are inter-dependent due to the mining winner Mô. We consider the case where all miners synchronously start their PoW processes by adjusting Twait such that T ( )
up,o ). In this case, even the miners completing the cross-verification earlier wait until T wait , providing the latency upper bound. With this approximation, we derive the optimal block generation rate λ * as follows. 
Proof: Applying the synchronous PoW approximation and the mean 1/(1 − p ( ) fork ) of the geometrically distributed N ( ) fork to (3),
The terms T wait , T ( ) dn,o , T ( ) global,o are constant delays given in Sect. II. For the probability p ( ) fork , using (4) with t ( ) For a larger λ, the forking event occurs more frequently, increasing the learning completion latency. On the contrary, for a high PoW difficulty with a low λ, the block generation time incurs its own overheads with excessive latency.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We numerically evaluate the proposed blockFL's average learning completion latency
By default, we consider ND = NM = 10, and Ni ∼ Uni(10, 50) ∀Di ∈ D. Following the 3GPP LTE Cat. M1 specification, we use Wup = Wdn = Wm = 300 KHz and γup,o = γdn,o = γoj = 10 dB. Other simulation parameters are given as: δd = 100 Kbit, δm = 5 Kbit, h = 200 Kbit, fc = 1 GHz, Twait = 50 ms, T a,wait = 500 ms. Fig. 3 -a shows the impact of block generation rate λ on the BlockFL's average learning completion latency. In Fig. 3 -a, we observe that the latency is convex-shaped and is decreasing with the SNRs. For the optimal block generation rate λ * , the minimized average learning completion latency obtained from Proposition 1 is always longer by up to 1.5% than the simulated minimum latency. In Fig. 3-b , the BlockFL and the vanilla FL achieve almost the same accuracy for an identical N D . On the other hand, the learning completion latency of our BlockFL is lower than that of the vanilla FL (N M = 1) as in Fig. 4 -a, which shows the scalability in terms of the numbers NM and ND of miners and devices, respectively. The average learning completion latency is computed for NM = 1, 10 with or without the miners' malfunction. The malfunction is captured by adding Gaussian noise N (−0.1, 0.01) to each miner's aggregate local model updates with probability 0.05. Without malfunction, a larger NM increases the latency due to the increase in their cross-verification and block propagation delays. In BlockFL, each miner's malfunction only distorts its associated device's global model update. Such distortion can be restored by federating with other devices that associate with the miners operating normally. Hence, a larger NM may achieve a shorter latency for NM = 10 with the malfunction. Fig. 4-a shows that there exists a latency-optimal number ND of devices. A larger ND enables to utilize a larger amount of data samples, whereas it increases each block size and block exchange delays, resulting in the convex-shaped latency. Fig. 4 . Average learning completion latency versus the number of devices, (a) under the miners' malfunction, (b) for different energy constraints θe, and (c) overtake probability with respect to the number of chained blocks.
In Fig. 4-b , we assume that some miners cannot participate if their battery level is lower than a predefined threshold value θ e , a normalized battery level, θ e ∈ [0,1]. Without the malfunction of miner nodes, the learning completion latency becomes larger for a lower θ e due to an increase in crossverification and block propagation delays. On the contrary, when the malfunction occurs, a lower θ e achieves a shorter latency because more miners federate with leading to robust global model updates. Fig. 4 -c shows the overtake probability that a malicious miner will ever form a new blockchain whose length is longer than a blockchain formed by honest miners. The overtake probability goes to zero if just a few blocks have already been chained by honest miners. Although the malicious miner begins the first PoW with the honest miners, the larger number of miners prevents the overtake.
